current regime. Economic restructuring into a post-industrial economy increased income inequality, reduced mobility, and made more people doubt the neoliberal myth and question the legitimacy of the business-dominated regime. In order for Hong Kong to emerge from its legitimacy crisis, the change in political values requires a more fundamental change in governing ideology, state-society relations, and political institutions.
T H E L E G i T i M AC Y O F T H E A N T E C E D E N T R E G i M E
Regime legitimacy depends on basic allegiance from its subjects, which in turn is conditioned upon affection for and positive evaluation of the system, its input processes, and policy outputs.
1 Colonial Hong Kong was born with an inherent legitimacy problem. As a non-elected polity imposed from abroad proffering only a low level of welfare, Hong Kong's colonial government nonetheless managed to elicit basic allegiance from its Chinese subjects for most of its history from 1842 to 1997.
There have been different explanations for the regime legitimacy of colonial Hong Kong. Scott claimed that the colonial regime was in repeated legitimacy crises after 1842, when China was forced to cede Hong Kong Island to the British following the First Opium War. In Scott's view, the recurring crisis was resolved each time by enlarging the circle of elites, gradually building a more inclusive corporatist regime. 2 Corporatism as a legitimacy formula was a recurrent theme in Hong Kong studies: Ambrose King's "administrative absorption of politics" formulation saw colonial legitimacy as rooted in a synarchy between colonial bureaucrats and appointed Chinese elites. 3 Potential opposition from Chinese society was pacified by appointing key Chinese elite members into fringes of the decision-making structure, and by granting them colonial honors.
A prevalent explanation for colonial stability amid rapid development in post-World War Two years was the political passivity of the Hong Kong Chinese. Lau Siu-kai saw postwar Hong Kong as a refugee society of immigrants from China who harbored "utilitarian familism," putting material citizens. 7 Before the 1980s, most Hong Kong people bought into the "Hong Kong as a lifeboat" concept: rocking the boat would only mean falling into the sea of Communist China.
T H E T W i N P i L L A R S O F P O S T-C O L O N i A L L E G i T i M AC Y
When decolonization started in the 1980s, Hong Kong started looking for a new legitimacy formula. With colonialism's imminent departure, the colonial masters found their authority rapidly depreciating. Decolonization and gradual democratization politicized Hong Kong society, with "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" after 1997 now a plausible alternative. Popular elections could have served as a new basis of legitimacy after 1997, but hopes for full democracy were quickly dashed by an unholy alliance of the Chinese government, British government, and local business conservatives. The Basic Law instituted only a semi-democratic regime, with business and professional elites heavily represented. The chief executive (CE) is elected by an Election Committee, which is elected by a narrow franchise including most major business and professional groups. The proportion of popularly elected seats in the Legislative Council (Legco) increased very gradually from 30% in 1991 to 50% in 2004; the other half was elected by functional constituencies (FCs) that represent the major business and professional groups. The Basic Law stipulates that the CE and the Legco would ultimately be fully elected by universal suffrage, yet no concrete timetable has been offered. This partial democratic formula was compatible with political values during the transition era. Surveys in the 1980s showed that while a majority of Hong Kong people supported faster democratization, they could also accept government by elites and civil servants, and they harbored paternalistic values. Many respondents saw "democracy" not in procedural or institutional terms but as a government that would consult public opinion, or as an instrument to ensure efficient government in order to bring about stability and prosperity. 8 In other words, the Hong Kong people had a "partial vision of democracy," seeing it not in terms of ideas or "rights" but rather as an instrument to achieve pragmatic goals. If good governance, civil liberties, and clean government could be maintained, Hong Kong people would be content with a partially democratic regime. 9 The Hong Kong people were also notorious for their low level of participation and low political efficacy. Surveys in the 1980s showed that although they actively consumed political news, levels of organizational political participation were very low; hence, the people were labeled as "attentive spectators."
10 Lau and Kuan attributed this low participation to a low sense of political efficacy: years of serving as colonial subjects made many believe that they had little say in government affairs. This brought weak mobilization in support of the democracy movement, in turn weakening the bargaining power of the democrats vis-à-vis the Chinese government.
Both the "attentive spectators" and "partial vision" narratives saw the political values of Hong Kong people as instrumental and pragmatic. In these narratives, Hong Kong people supported democracy not because of its intrinsic value or as a principle of societal or political organization, but because they believed it could deliver good governance and defend their way of life. Even if they supported democracy, they considered their participation inconsequential in bringing about its fruition, and many preferred to stay away and free-ride. Because they did not see a democratic system as a natural right, they could settle for a partial democratic reform before and after 1997.
On top of the partial-democratic system, the Basic Law enshrines a neoliberal economic regime that perpetuates the pre-1997 low-welfare and lowinterventionist regime. Hong Kong has long been regarded as the last bastion of free market ideology. Rapid economic advancement in postwar years made many Hong Kong people believe that non-interventionism was the best philosophy of economic governance, and adherence to free market principles was the key to Hong Kong's economic miracle. For those who had fled from mainland China to Hong Kong, "socialism" was associated with the command economy that had caused economic havoc in China, and the overpoliticized Communist regime that was the antithesis of free-wheeling Hong Kong. During the political transition preceding 1997, "stability" and "prosperity" were hailed as collective goals of Hong Kong, as a conservative, procapitalist ideology was consolidated. For decades, neoliberal ideology in Hong Kong was justified on the grounds that it provides "equal opportunity." Surveys in the 1980s showed that the Hong Kong people in general, and the middle class in particular, bought into the dictums of equal opportunity, upward mobility, and selfreliance within the Hong Kong capitalist order. The Social Indicators Surveys (SIS) 11 in the 1980s showed that more than 80% of respondents thought Hong Kong was a "land of opportunities" with adequate chances for upward mobility.
12 A similar proportion believed that one could change one's fortunes by working hard, and that one's economic fortunes were largely determined by individual hard work and education. 13 The better-educated and higher-salaried professionals had more confidence in this "openness thesis," largely, because they were the winners in the competitive game.
14 Lau and Kuan's survey in 1988 showed 57.5% of respondents agreeing with the government's "laissez-faire" policy. 15 Because quite a few in Hong Kong did improve their living standards through hard work and improved education during the economic take-off, economic inequality under Hong Kong's neoliberal regime was legitimized by "equal opportunity" and "open chances of upward mobility." Hong Kong's neoliberal economic regime was institutionalized and made official ideology by the Basic Law. Driven by the concept of "fiscal constitution,"
16 the Basic Law stipulates low tax rates (Article 107), a balanced budget (Article 107), free flow of capital and no foreign exchange 11. The SISs were a long-term collaborative project by Hong Kong social scientists since 1988. Through biennial territory-wide surveys, the project focused on subjective indicators such as perceptions, behavioral tendencies, values, beliefs, and sense of well-being, and explored their implications for the social development of Hong Kong.
12. Wong Wai-pong, "Inequality, Stratification, and Mobility," in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds. 16. Fiscal constitution is defined as "to impose legally and morally binding constitutional rules so as to limit the government's fiscal capacity and its interference in the private sector." See Tang controls (Articles 112 and 115), and free port status and free trade (Articles 114 and 115) in the post-1997 economic regime. 17 The legitimacy of the post-1997 political and economic regime relied on an instrumental and partial view of democracy by the Hong Kong people, and belief in the fairness of a lowintervention economic system. The following sections will show how political, social, and economic changes in the past 20 years gradually transformed political values in Hong Kong, leading to the crumbling of these "twin pillars" of the legitimacy of the post-1997 regime. The democracy movement in the 1980s more or less tried to cope strategically with the instrumental view of the Hong Kong people at the time. The democrats' major argument for the necessity of democracy after 1997 was that it is the best system to guarantee autonomy, freedom, and rule of law. In other words, a popularly elected government was more likely to stave off intervention from Beijing and defend Hong Kong's way of life, or in a popular phrase at the time, minju kanggong (resist communism by democracy).
Political development in the new century changed the nature of support for democracy and enhanced the sense of political efficacy of the Hong Kong people. The turning point was July 1, 2003, when 500,000 Hong Kong citizens (more than 7% of the population) took to the streets to protest against the impending enactment of the National Security Ordinance. Based on Article 23 of the Basic Law, the proposed legislation outlawed acts related to sedition, secession, theft of state secrets, and other political acts deemed threatening to the national security of China. Human rights groups and legal professionals criticized the draft legislation as too imprecise and liable to abuse by the authorities. 18 The post-1997 economic downturn and various governance problems aroused anti-government sentiments, and the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in spring 2003 plunged Hong Kong's economy to a historic low. The July rally was a grand outburst against government failure, driven by the fear of loss of freedom. The show of people's power forced withdrawal of the bill and the resignation of two unpopular bureau secretaries, sparking a rebirth of the democracy movement. In the years that followed, the July 1 rally became an annual demonstration of people's power, where political and civil society groups staged a plethora of demands, including the recurrent theme of full democracy.
Research Table 1 ).
The political efficacy of Hong Kong was still low compared to other Asian regions, but a small contingent of active participants began to emerge. Focus group research showed that the July 1 experience was one of empowerment: participants gained the confidence to participate in future social actions, bringing to the fore a core of activists who were no longer "attentive spectators."
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After 1997, the democrats seldom asserted minju kanggong, the notion that democracy is a tool to fend off intervention from China, probably in part for reasons of "political correctness." Instead, they attributed governance failures, business-government collusion, and low responsiveness to public needs to the undemocratic and business-dominated nature of the regime. The 2003 National Security Legislation saga, when the government tried to push unpopular legislation through a partly elected legislature, gave the democrats much ammunition to convince Hong Kong people that a non-democracy could easily imperil civil liberties they had long cherished. These are still all "instrumental" arguments about democracy.
During the 2003 movements, the main slogan was "sovereignty to the people," alluding to the key concept in Western democratic ideology. This note: DK = "don't know"; NA = "no answer" or "don't understand."
quickly drew criticism from Beijing, where officials charged that "people's sovereignty" was a separatist slogan. 21 As a result, "sovereignty to the people" was used less frequently. The democrats began to argue that election by universal suffrage is a basic human right. In debates or meetings in the Legco, 21 . In China's official ideology, the Communist Party represents all the people of China, and they delegate part of the power to the Hong Kong government. In this official rhetoric, Hong Kong's sovereignty handover in 1997 was already "sovereignty to the people." To Beijing, demanding "sovereignty to the Hong Kong people" is tantamount to seeing Hong Kong as a separate political entity deriving its sovereignty from the Hong Kong "people," which smacks of separatism.
pro-democracy legislators repeatedly questioned government officials as to how current electoral arrangements could be considered compatible with the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 22 which sees universal and equal suffrage as a basic right. This usually put officials in a difficult situation because they are reluctant to admit that Hong Kong falls short of ICCPR standards but cannot deny the inequality of the current CE and Legco elections.
In 2008, about 213,000 electors, members of various business and professional groups, elected 30 legislators through the FCs, while about 3.2 million general electors elected another 30. This means that an FC voter's vote is worth about 15 times that of a general voter. 23 In the 2007 Green Paper on Constitutional Development, the Hong Kong government admitted that electing the CE and Legco by universal suffrage was a constitutional goal that must ultimately be attained. The question is how and when. 24 In the 2009 consultation on constitutional reform, Chief Secretary Henry Tang admitted that the current FC system falls short of the requirements of universal and equal suffrage as required by the ICCPR. 25 The changing narratives and political movements after 1997 brought value changes to democracy in Hong Kong. The AB surveys tested various aspects of political values, including support for paternalism, authoritarian alternatives, a moral state, political pluralism, political equality, and checks and balances. In Tables 2A-2C, I Tables 2A-2C ).
Hong Kong also had a lower support level for paternalism and the moral state than most Asian states except Taiwan and Japan. Hong Kong is more inclined to pluralism and checks and balances than many other states, inferior only to Japan and South Korea, with Vietnam and Indonesia at a similar level. The support for political equality was lower than that of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam, but almost 80% of respondents agreed that less-educated people should have as much say as the more-educated. All in all, the AB figures showed that by 2007 Hong Kong evinced stronger support for democratic values than many electoral democracies in Asia, behind only a few modernized and consolidated democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) (see Tables 3A-3E) .
The enhanced support for democracy has several implications. The "partial vision of democracy" thesis posits that Hong Kong people can settle for halfbaked reforms because they see democracy in instrumental terms, and if the political goods can be delivered by an undemocratic system, they can live with the status quo. As more and more people in Hong Kong conceive democracy in terms of political rights or equality, they are less likely to accept partial democracy. If full democracy is not delivered, the pursuit of it will continue. Second, performance legitimacy is not sufficient when the people adopt a less instrumental view. They would continue to demand procedural legitimacy in policy-making, including democratic policy-making and government borne by election. Third, for want of procedural legitimacy, government decisions are liable to challenge by civil society mobilization. Although the government controls the majority in the Legco, societal mobilization against unpopular decisions would aggravate the government's legitimacy problems.
ECONO M iC C HA N G E S A N D T H E P E Ri S H i N G O F T H E N E O Li B E R A L M Y T H
In the 1980s, the Hong Kong people were so confident in the fairness of the neoliberal regime that its principles were elevated to "constitutional" status in the Basic Law. However, economic restructuring since the 1980s has gradually weakened the credibility of the "open thesis" of neoliberal ideology. Since the 1980s, Hong Kong's manufacturing industries have moved north of the border source: Ibid. to Table 2 . note: The higher the value of M, the higher the support for a moral state.
in search of cheaper labor and land. Hong Kong began to transform into an international financial center, a logistics center, and an entrepôt feeding off China's phenomenal growth. 26 The transformation into a post-industrial economy put Hong Kong's low-skilled labor at risk. The Asian financial crisis aggravated the situation, leading to drastic pay cuts and rising unemployment.
Instead of reinforcing state action to help those affected by the crisis, the Hong Kong government's response was a renewed drive for neoliberalization. 27 In the face of a burgeoning budget deficit and negative growth, the government accelerated marketization, subcontracting, and privatization, including privatizing more public assets to feed the financial market. This neoliberalization drive heightened job insecurity among middle class professionals, arousing strong protests from civil servants and public sector professionals. In the private sector, more corporations pursued slimmer and less hierarchical structures to cut costs, making many experienced middle/upper level managers redundant. 28 Unemployment climbed from the lowest point of 2.2% in 1997 to the highest point of 7.9% in 2003, affecting almost all walks of the salaried class (see Figure 1) . 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 The share of flexible employment in the labor force increased, meaning less job security and more pressure on average employees. 29 Income inequality increased as more people moved into the highest-and lowest-paying job levels simultaneously. 30 The Gini coefficient of Hong Kong (for household income) 31 32 The economic changes cast doubts on the "openness thesis." Upward mobility was not guaranteed with hard work, as many in Hong Kong had chosen to believe, even for the well-educated middle class. Increased monopolization made it more difficult for small businesses to survive. Privatization of public housing malls gradually saw small proprietors driven out by drastic rent hikes and replaced by chain stores. Studying the subjective class identifications of Hong Kong people in the past 20 years, Zheng and Wong pointed out that 1997 was a watershed for the perception of social mobility. 33 The percentage who defined themselves as lower class steadily increased after 1997, even during the economic rebound in 2005 (see Table 4 ). The less educated, who bore the brunt of the economic downturn after 1997, were the most pessimistic. In the 1988 and 1990 SISs, about 63% believed that their family living standard would be better after three years; the figures decreased to around 30% in surveys in 2001, 2004, and 2006 34 (see Table 5 ), a clear decrease in optimism about the prospects of mobility in the Hong Kong capitalist order. More people began to question neoliberal dictums. In 1988, surveys found 58% agreed with the laissez-faire policy, while only 42% did in 1994. The 1999 SIS showed that 45% supported maintaining the "positive noninterventionist policy," while 23% were opposed. 35 More people began to question the fairness of the system. The 1999 SIS had 67% believing that Hong Kong's capitalist system allows fair competition, about 20% lower than the figures in the 1980s. The 1997 SIS had 56.7% agreeing that average employees were not treated fairly, 50% agreeing that there was not enough protection for workers, 77.8% agreeing that social welfare was not sufficient, and 63% considering wealth distribution in Hong Kong to be unfair (up from 57% in 1994). 36 The changing perceptions of the capitalist system were accompanied by a rise in anti-neoliberal social movements after 1997, beginning with antiprivatization movements in the public sector, from civil servants, teachers, and other service professionals. A critical mass of anti-globalization and antiprivatization civil society groups coalesced over subsequent years, staging movements to counter the dominant neoliberal narrative, push for policy changes, and promote community self-help, gradually changing the discourses of local social movements.
Two events best illustrated this value change. In 2004, the government decided to privatize car parks, shopping malls, and other facilities in public housing estates by putting these assets in a real estate investment trust (REIT) named The Link, and listing it on the stock exchange. Pressure groups of public housing tenants were adamant that privatization would drive up rents and then living costs. They took the government to court, accusing it of violating the Housing Ordinance, which guaranteed government provision of basic facilities for public housing tenants. The court action delayed listing of The Link, arousing vehement criticism from all corners. Most Hong Kong people saw the project as an ordinary public listing from which they could make a quick fortune in the under-priced initial public offering. Most did not see the pitfalls of privatization, choosing to believe the government's promise that it could bring better management. A couple of years after privatization, the public quickly found out the cruel fact of drastic rent hikes in Link-operated malls, which drove prices up and small proprietors out. This lent a big support to anti-privatization narratives and movements: many small shop owners joined in efforts to oppose rent hikes since 2007. 37 The Sixth World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference, held in Hong Kong in December 2005, was hailed by the government as a major international event, a hallmark of Hong Kong's place in globalized capitalism. Protest groups from all over Asia clashed violently with the Hong Kong police, drawing the public's attention to the debate over globalization. The conference was a major rallying point for anti-globalization groups in Hong Kong. The widespread coverage and high-profile protests provided an unprecedented chance for the propaganda of the anti-neoliberal narratives. 38 The government's persistent neoliberalism during the economic downturn made people question the political origins of its economic philosophy. Dissatisfaction with the business class increased, and more people saw their economic plight as originating from business dominance. The 1997 SIS showed 52% of respondents considered business people to be too powerful. 39 In the 2006 SIS, when asked about the influence of business leaders on government policy, 44% said "very big," 22% said "big," while only about 5% thought the influence "small" or "very small." As many as 82.4% of the respondents believed that there was government-business collusion, with 44% seeing the problem as "serious" or "very serious." About 47% agreed that the government was unable to constrain the scramble for interests among business leaders. 40 The diminishing credibility of the neoliberal ideology weakened the legitimacy of the political regime. The legitimacy of the low-intervention strategy and political privileges for the business sector hinges on the belief that the society benefited from it as a whole. This was in turn premised on the pragmatic and instrumental inclinations of the Hong Kong people, who were willing to tolerate political and economic inequality in exchange for the perceived economic viability of the system. When both these "pillars" were weakened, the legitimacy of the business-dominated, non-elected regime was on shaky ground.
TO WA R D P O S T-M AT E R i A L i S M ?
Inglehart posited that a major trend of value change in advanced societies is from "materialist" to "post-materialist" values. With economic affluence, the stress on economic and physical security and bread-and-butter (materialist) issues in the industrial age gradually gives way to self-expression values and quality of life (post-materialism) issues in post-industrial societies. 41 The value change toward self-expression and post-materialism poses a challenge to authoritarian regimes. In established democracies, the value change drives the young generation to shun traditional forms of participation, such as voting and political parties, in favor of unconventional, expressive, and elitechallenging mass actions through loosely organized civic networks. 42 The past narrative of Hong Kong's stability and legitimacy rests on the assumption of a materialist culture. With Hong Kong transforming into a post-industrial society since the 1980s, the young generation that grew up in relative affluence should focus less on economic security and more on postmaterialist values. However, the SISs in the 1990s showed only a minimal proportion of respondents who could be classified as "post-materialists." The 1993 SIS classified only 0.3% of respondents as post-materialists, with the vast majority as "mixed type." 43 The 1995 SIS classified 0.6% as post-materialists. 44 Based on the 1992 East Asian Middle Class survey, Hsiao and Wan classified 8.5% as post-materialists and 68% as mixed. 45 Inglehart and Welzel argued that although modernization was the structural factor behind post-materialism, progress was not linear: historical events could bring sudden changes in values, leading to breakthroughs or retrogression. 46 Events in 2003 served as accelerators in the value change toward post-materialism. The SARS epidemic, which took 299 lives in Hong Kong, plunged the whole city into economic and psychological distress. It aroused a renewed sense of community as the media and social organizations started campaigns to help medical professionals and victims. The 2004 SIS showed that many respondents agreed SARS made them care more about non-materialist aspects of life such as personal health, community hygiene, friends, and the meaning of life. Fewer said they were more concerned about work. 47 About 81% agreed that "the SARS epidemic made Hong Kong people more caring," and 53.5% agreed that "the July 1 [2003] rally made Hong Kong people more united." 48 A comparison of SISs in 1997 and 2006 showed that the public in the latter year paid more attention to issues such as pollution, education, and health services 49 (see Tables 6 and 7) . By 2006, 80% believed that the government should spend more money on environmental protection, the highest percentage of support among 13 policy areas. 50 This value change brought movements for environmental and heritage protection, spurring a resuscitation of Hong Kong identity and more hatred against the business-dominated regime. In 2004, a movement against reclamation of Victoria Harbor led to an outpouring of nostalgic sentiment, with developers to blame for relentless reclamation for development, and for building skyscrapers that hurt air quality and destroyed the "skyscape." *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Degree of seriousness is calculated by the mean score on the perceived seriousness of the social issues: 1 = very minor; 2 = minor; 3 = average; 4 = serious; 5 = very serious.
identity. In rediscovering and re-narrating bits of history through these movements, the activists asserted that Hong Kong's history was rich in social movements and political action, and not a purely "economic city," as the mainstream narrative suggests. Hong Kong played an important role in China's political development, and small closely knit communities, apart from the globalized metropole, were part and parcel of Hong Kong's way of life. These movements symbolized resistance against pervasive developmentalism, against business domination of land policy and top-down decisionmaking by the government. These value changes were well expressed in the anti-express rail link (XRL) campaign of 2009-10. The campaign started with protests from villagers who were forced to relocate to make way for a US$857 million XRL to mainland China. More problems were revealed with information disclosure about the XRL plan, leading to a territory-wide movement of considerable scale. The campaign became a grand standoff of contrasting ideologies, and public opinion was deeply split. 53 The government justified the XRL through expected economic benefits brought by enhanced integration with China. It was supported by the business sector in general, and by sectors that would benefit: engineers and architects who would get jobs, tourism and consumption sectors eyeing more mainland tourists, real estate developers envisaging more mainland "hot money," and the like.
On the other hand, opposing activists criticized the government for sacrificing small, old, closely knit communities on the grounds of overall economic (business) interest. They accused the government of seeing land only as a commodity for making money, disregarding its meaning in and links with human life. They claimed that the expensive XRL would serve mostly the middle and upper class, and its construction would disrupt urban households and create traffic congestion. Above all, they were unhappy with the top-down decision-making and the ignoring of affected communities for urban planning.
Starting from December 16, 2009, a group of young protesters, mostly under 30 years of age, used the "satyagraha walk" (kuxing) as a form of protest. Holding rice and seeds in their hands, the barefooted protesters walked very slowly to a drumbeat, prostrated themselves once every 26 steps, 54 and walked for 15 hours per day for three days. The protesters claimed this enabled them to directly experience the linkage between people and land; rediscover the importance of the land that feeds them; rethink their own identity; and show their respect to community networks, land, and life. the proposal by dint of its control of the legislative majority, with the support of most FC members.
The XRL campaign also reflected deep-rooted uneasiness among the Hong Kong people about integration with mainland China. With increased social and economic integration after 1997, there were fears that Hong Kong would lose its identity and distinctiveness. The cry for rediscovering Hong Kong's identity, rethinking how people are related to land, and protecting indigenous communities reflected the rise of indigenous sentiments, and was a response to growing dominance of China over Hong Kong's political and economic affairs. The XRL was seen as something that served China more than Hong Kong, imposed by Beijing and pushed through against public opposition by a Beijing-designed political structure. Physically, the XRL may bring better China-Hong Kong integration in the future, but sentimentally, it strained relations.
The anti-XRL campaign exposed the multifaceted legitimacy problems of the Hong Kong government. The old formula justifying the sacrifice of minority conditions for "overall economic interest" failed to convince the young generation, now skeptical about the fairness of neoliberalist theory. On the materialist/post-materialist divide, government officials found themselves talking at cross purposes with the protesters. The government's gospel of developmentalism would never convert those disciples of post-materialism who treasure land, community, and less materialistic lifestyles.When the government failed to win over public opinion and resorted to political strongarm tactics, the injustice of the regime became all too apparent. The top-down decision-making, the pro-business ideology and policy, and the dominance of the FC elites were all seen as roots of economic inequality and injustice in Hong Kong, in the end raising a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.
C O N C L u S i O N S
Various narratives have been proposed for the origins of the post-1997 governance and legitimacy crisis of Hong Kong. Lee and Ma concurred that institutional incongruity was the root cause: current institutions were unable to cope with societal demands and developmental needs. 56 Lau attributed 56. Eliza Lee, "Governing Post-colonial Hong Kong: Institutional Incongruity, Governance Crisis, and Authoritarianism," Asian Survey 39:6 (November-December 1999), pp. 940-59; former CE Tung Chee-hwa's (1997-2005) governing crisis to a wrong governing strategy, while Lo blamed it on decreasing levels of institutionalization and weak political communication. 57 Goodstadt argued that the lack of sectoral intervention in colonial times made the public believe that the government would not seek private benefit at the expense of public interest. It follows that sectoral intervention after 1997 will bring accusations of government-business collusion, undermining the government's legitimacy. Chiu and Lui saw the origins of the crisis in the government's inability to build a ruling alliance that could legitimately allocate interests after the departure of the colonial masters. 58 The above scholars, however, did not address the role of value changes in this crisis. The design of the post-1997 legitimacy formula assumes a materialist, pragmatic Hong Kong populace with only an instrumental support for democracy and who could tolerate a non-elected government and unequal economic regime as long as economic goods could be delivered. Decades of value change have made the old formula powerless in face of a new generation that adopts a less instrumental view of governance, has much less faith in the fairness of the neoliberal regime, and is more self-expressive and postmaterialist. With the passage of time, the gap between the old legitimacy formula and the political values of Hong Kong people will only widen. A brief economic rebound or improvement in government performance is unlikely to rescue the Hong Kong government from its legitimacy problem. Without an overhaul of neoliberal ideology, democratic institutional reforms, and/or a renegotiation of the state-society contract, the Hong Kong government will likely find itself facing ever-increasing challenges to its legitimacy in the future.
With increasing integration between China and Hong Kong, these value changes can be expected to affect mainland society, heightening Hong Kong's tensions with the Chinese government. newspaper Nanfang Dushi Bao gave the 2010 Citizens Award to Choi Yuen Village (the Hong Kong New Territories area village that started the XRL campaign). Anti-XRL struggles found resonance in mainland communities that repeatedly had their land rights violated by local officials.
Struggle movements for human and civil rights in Hong Kong could spill over and inspire mainland activists, particularly in an age of network activism. With the Hong Kong people more supportive of basic rights and more concerned about economic inequality, reports of human rights violations and economic oppression (such as tragedies at Foxconn) 59 in China have created much distaste for the Chinese government. It will be increasingly difficult for China's emphasis on "development first" or "harmonious society," both values or goals suiting early industrial ages, to find echo in the postindustrial society of Hong Kong.
It seems probable that as Hong Kong activists become more conscious of ways to use their freedom to influence China, as Hong Kong media reports highlight mainland dissidents' actions and plights, and as social protests are potentially "re-imported" to the mainland, a process is underway of mutual influence between civil societies across the border. Beijing will undoubtedly see this as a thorn in its political flesh. But its solution has been to redouble its efforts at China's economic integration with Hong Kong, which ironically may only expose the wide value gap and sharpen tensions between them.
59. Foxconn International Holdings is the largest producer of electronic components in the world. In the year 2010, 18 employees of a Foxconn plant in Guangdong committed suicide because of extremely adverse working conditions in the factories. This created an uproar against and great concern about the abysmal working conditions in China's factories.
